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Abstract
This Note will discuss recent US import quotas in light of the United States’ obligations under
GATT. Part I of this Note will examine the legal frameworks of the US Constitution, GATT, and
section 301. Part Ii will focus on the domestic and international conflicts that have stemmed from
recent protectionist legislation proposed by Congress. Part III will criticize the conflict between
the President and congress, the application of section 301, and the dispute resolution provisions of
GATT. Finally, Part IV will propose improvements for the performance of the United States under
GATT and section 301. This Note will conclude that the United States must improve its trade
policy by coordinating its trade actions with section 301 and GATT.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
CONGRESSIONAL IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE
INTRODUCTION
Conflicting approaches taken by the United States Con-
gress and the President to improve the United States interna-
tional trading position' have led to actual violations of the
1. Since 1977, the United States balance on current accounts in the United
States international transactions has generally fallen below zero, reaching a deficit
level of U.S.$101.5 billion in 1984. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 796 (106th ed. 1986). In the second quarter of
1985, the trade deficit was U.S.$31.8 billion. Id. The United States annual imports
have exceeded annual exports each year since 1978, sometimes by as much as
U.S.$325 billion of imports to U.S.$225 billion of exports. See Farnsworth, Veto Seen
For Curbs on Textiles, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at D6, col. 4 (graph reprinted from an
International Monetary Fund Source).
The growing popularity of protectionism in the United States Congress has
threatened to disrupt the international trading system. Silk, Protectionist Mood: Mount-
ing Pressure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at DI, col. 3. After having pursued a free
trade policy for the past fifty years, in the fall of 1985 Congress has considered pro-
tectionist measures. Id. These restrictive measures have been likened to some of the
major causes of the Great Depression. Id. Senator Robert Dole reportedly told the
Council on Foreign Relations that he had "never seen stronger Congressional senti-
ment for acting on the trade front." 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1104 (Sept.
11, 1985). Congressional action in response to trade imbalances is not a novelty. See
generally SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, S. REP.
No. 1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (United States trade imbalances and surging
United States imports in the late 1960's led to intense lobbying for import restric-
tions).
In the first nine months of 1985, members of Congress had proposed 300 bills
suggesting mandatory restrictions on imports of various types of goods. For exam-
ple, the Thurmond-Jenkins bill would have limited shoe imports from the existing 77
percent of the United States market to 55 percent, and would have strengthened
current textile import quotas from one percent annual increases to six percent an-
nual increases. See, e.g., H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985) (a bill to promote economic recovery 'of the United States
textile and apparel industry and its workers); H.R. 1973, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REC. H 1901 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985) (a bill providing for orderly trade in the
nonrubber footwear industry).
Ultimately, these pressures resulted in the passage of a bill restricting imports of
textiles. On October 10, 1985, by a 262 to 159 vote, the House of Representatives
passed H.R. 1562, which restricts imports, 24 votes short of the two-thirds majority
needed to override the expected presidential veto. H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
131 CONG. REC. H8622 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1985); see 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
41, at 1288 (Oct. 16, 1985). On November 13, 1985, the Senate voted 60 to 39 to
pass H.R. 1562, seven votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to override an
expected presidential veto. H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
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S15342-43 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1985); see 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 46, at 1167
(Nov. 20, 1985).
President Reagan has consistently opposed restrictive economic proposals. See,
e.g., 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1107 (Sept. 11, 1985) ("[p]rotectionism is a
crippling cure far more dangerous than any economic illness"); Boyd, President Urges
U.S. Lawmakers To Block Protectionist 'Stampede, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at Al, col.
4 ("a mindless stampede toward protectionism will be a one-way trip to economic
disaster"); Weinraub, Reagan Rejects Shoe Import Curb, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1985, at
DI, col. 2 ("[p]lacing quotas on shoe imports would be detrimental to the national
economic interest"); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1107 (Sept. 11, 1985)
(quote relief cost over U.S.$3 billion over the last five years to protect domestic jobs
in the shoe industry).
In response to the congressional pressure for quotas, the Reagan Administration
has proposed a series of punitive actions against certain trade practices. For in-
stance, the President has planned action against the European Economic Commu-
nity, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil to remove barriers to United States exports of
canned fruit, cigarettes, leather, insurance, and computers. Farnsworth, Veto Seen For
Curbs on Textiles, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at DI, col. 6.
In addition, as part of his trade policy initiative, President Reagan unveiled a
proposed U.S.$3 million fund to stimulate United States exports and to encourage a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 38,
at 1182 (Sept. 25, 1985); Weinraub, Reagan to Push Free Trade in Talk Monday, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1985, at 8, col. 1. The bill incorporating this proposal received a
mixed reaction from the Senate Banking Subcommittee. S. 1763, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S13122 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1985); see also 2 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 44, at 1394 (Nov. 6, 1985) (a report of mixed reactions in the Senate).
However, the House Banking Trade Subcommittee voted unanimously for the sub-
sidy on November 7, 1985. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 45, at 1439 (Nov. 13,
1985). This bill authorized U.S.$300 million to be mixed with regular loans for
meeting foreign financing competition. Congress has delayed this bill until the fiscal
year 1986. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 1566 (Dec. 18, 1985).
On December 17, 1985, President Reagan vetoed textile bill H.R. 1562 less than
an hour before it was to become law. President's Message to the House of Repre-
sentatives Returning H.R. 1562 Without Approval, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1510-11 (Dec. 23, 1985). In the veto message, President Reagan restated his posi-
tion "not to stand by and watch American workers lose their jobs because other na-
tions do not play by the rules." Id. at 1510. To determine whether the United States'
trading partners were abiding by the terms of their trading agreements with the
United States, the President directed the Secretary of the Treasury to investigate tex-
tile import levels to determine whether international agreements have been
breached. Id. The President also asked United States Trade Representative [herein-
after referred to as USTR] Clayton Yeutter to consult with the textile industry and
incorporate the industry's views into any renegotiation of multilateral agreements,
and directed the Secretary of Labor to work with Congress to provide U.S.$ 100 mil-
lion in additional funds to relocate displaced workers. Id. Summarizing the Adminis-
tration's trade policy, the President stated that "[w]e want to open markets abroad,
not close them at home. In a fair and open market we know that America can out-
produce and out-compete anybody." Id. at 1511.
In response to the President's veto, the House has scheduled a delayed vote for
August 3, 1986 to override the veto. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 1,
1986). Meanwhile, proponents of the legislation plan to muster the necessary two-
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAFT) 2 and have
weakened the United States role in that international agree-
ment. Protective trade action4 taken by Congress in disregard
of United States obligations under GATT 5 has given rise to
thirds majority to override a veto and to prevent extensive retaliation by United
States trading partners. Id.
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as
GATT]. See generally J.JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATr 329-32 (1969)
(review of the creation of GAT). GATT required the initial members to sign the
Protocol of Provision Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (effective January
1, 1948). GATT is still applied through this Protocol and is binding on the United
States. See infra notes 38-62.
The type of unilaterally determined import relief proposed by Congress conflicts
with the multilateral free trade agreement embodied in GATT. These import quotas
conflict with two of the most basic substantive obligations of GAT: 1) the Most
Favored Nation Treatment and 2) a series of commitments regarding nontariff trade
barriers. See GAT, supra, art. 1 (General Most Favored Nation), art. 11 (General
Elimination of Restrictions), art. 13 (Nondiscriminatory Administration of Quantita-
tive Restrictions); infra note 5 and accompanying text; see also J. JACKSON, supra, 194,
249-70, 305-21 (discussion of GAT obligations).
3. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, 955 (July 24, 1985). USTR Yeutter told
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade that the proposed bill imposing
a surcharge on imports could violate GATT and expose the United States to compen-
sation claims and retaliation. Id. The bill would require the executive branch to initi-
ate certain trade actions against major trading partners before seeking GATT settle-
ment and relief. See H.R. 3035, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5972 (daily
ed. July 18, 1985); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 955 (July 24, 1985).
Although seeking to benefit certain sectors of the United States economy, the bill
would require the Administration to circumvent, and in effect, withdraw from GAT
dispute settlement procedures. See supra notes 33-37, 136 and accompanying text.
4. For the purposes of this Note, protective trade action or protectionism refers
to direct restrictions on the amount of certain goods such as textiles that are imposed
by Congress in the form of import quotas. D. SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
208 (1984). Cumulatively, import quotas hurt consumers who must pay higher
prices and choose their goods from a limited market. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with
Japan and the American Policy Response, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1657 (1984); see, e.g., 131
CONG. REC. S12457 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1985) (statement of Sen. Danforth). S. 680, the
textile-apparel quota bill, would cost consumers in the United States approximately
U.S.$14 billion per year. See id. Import quota cost has also been estimated at U.S.$2
billion a year in additional consumer costs. Farnsworth, Veto Seen For Curbs On Textiles,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at DI, col. 6. Some estimates place the cost of import
quotas to the United States consumer at U.S.$300,000 per United States textile job
saved. 2 INrr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1115 (Sept. 11, 1985).
By reducing competition in certain domestic markets, import quotas slow United
States industrial productivity. Hay & Sulzenko, U.S. Trade Policy and "Recripocity ", 16
J. WORLD TRADE L. 471, 479 (1982). Protectionism supports declining industries,
thereby shielding their inefficiencies from innovation and investment that could im-
prove their competitiveness. Schoenbaum, supra, at 1651.
5. GAT, supra note 2, art. 1 (General Most Favored Nation). The Most Fa-
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national and international distrust6 in the ability of GATT to
function as an instrument of free trade and to preserve the sta-
bility of international trade.7 Flagrant disagreement between
vored Nation obligation of GATT requires that the goods of any contracting party be
given "no less favorable" treatment than that given other contracting parties. Id.; cf
S. 1404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S9185 (daily ed. July 9, 1985) (a bill
to respond to unfair trade practices of Japan); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at
951 (July 24, 1985) (anti-Japanese emotions prompted restrictive trade legislation).
Anti-Japanese emotions in the United States prompted protectionist legislation
against Japan. Id.
6. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1207 (Sept. 25, 1985). For example, on
Sept. 18, 1985, Nobou Matsunaga, Japan's ambassador to the United States, warned
the United States of possible retaliation by Japan. Id.; 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
36, at 1105 (Sept. 9, 1985). Likewise, Japanese Vice President Susumi Nikaido
warned on September 10, 1985 of a crisis situation between Japan and the United
States which could lead to Japanese trade retaliation. Id.
South Korea also warned of retaliation, threatening both not to support the
United States request for a new round of multilateral negotiations in GAIT, and to
seek compensation under GATT. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 973 (July
31, 1985) (the executive branch anticipated threats of retaliation, particularly from
the Far East); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 963 (July 24, 1985).
On July 18, 1985, European Community delegate Tran Van Tink warned the
GATT Council that the Community would retaliate in kind if the United States im-
posed shoe quotas. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 958 (July 24, 1985).
Twenty-eight developing nations, voicing their opposition to the quotas and warning
that H.R. 1562 would violate the GATT, wrote letters to the Senate Finance Commit-
tee and the House Ways and Means Committee. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 28,
at 896 (July 10, 1985). USTR Yeutter predicted that stringent import quotas would
result in "substantial retaliation" against United States exports and would unravel
more than 30 bilateral international trade agreements. A Race For Import Curbs, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1985, at E4, col. 1; see Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
in MANUAL FOR THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 16 (W. Ince & L. Glick
eds. 1984); Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1651, 1657; 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
38, at 1188 (Sept. 25, 1985); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 958 (July 24,
1985).
Although remedial, retaliation as a means to eliminate an unfair trade practice is
not an end in itself. At best, retaliation serves as a good threat. Archibald, supra, at
16. Factors affecting the viability of retaliation as a part of a trade policy include:
1) the consistency of the proposed retaliation with international obligations, 2) tile
likelihood of counter-retaliation, 3) the likely success of retaliation to eliminate tile
unfair practice, 4) the possible adverse effects on other national interests, and 5) the
effect on the general bilateral relationship. Id. at 17; see D. SALVATORE, supra note 4,
at 213-15; see also 131 CONG. REC. S 12457 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Danforth). The Senator valued the risk of retaliation at U.S.$33 billion of United
States exports. See id.
7. Dymock & Vogt, Protectionist Pressures in the U.S. Congress, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L.
496, 498, 511 (1983); see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
MTN AND THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 15 (Comm. Print 1979)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE STAFF REPORT]. "Many governments have hesitated or
refused to invoke the procedures of Article XXIII [of GATT]." SENATE STAFF RE-
PORT at 15; see also Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
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the legislative and executive branches of the United States
Government8 has diminished trust in the ability of the United
WORLD TRADE L. 93, at 93-106 (1979). At leave five causes of the crisis of confidence
in the international trade system can be delineated: 1) the sluggishness of the world
economy, 2) growing skepticism about liberal trade and comparative advantage as an
economic model, 3) growing recognition of the dangers and disadvantages of eco-
nomic interdependence, 4) greater divergence between the economic structures of
GATT members, and 5) the breakdown of GATT. Jackson, supra, at 93-96.
During 1982, the United States Congress expressed doubt about the usefulness
of GATT and attempted to legislate protectionist measures. Dymock & Vogt, supra,
at 498, 511. See generally Protectionism That Protects Nothing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1985,
at A20, col. 1 (congressional protectionism would damage international political and
economic interests such as GATT); Roberts, Curb On Imports Of Textile Gains, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at Al, col. 2 (Representative ThomasJ. Downey, House Trade
Subcommittee member, warned that textile bills could undermine the international
trading system).
Protectionist legislation could disrupt the highly integrated international econ-
omy by disturbing the interdependence of the contribution of budget deficits, high
interest rates, an overvalued dollar, trade deficits and rising international debt that
has served as the base for recent United States and foreign economic growth.
Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1651-57; Silk, Capital Inflows and Trade Gap, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1985, at D2, col. 3. President Reagan stated:
[o]ur economy is truly interwoven with those of our trading partners. If we
cut the threads that hold us together, we injure ourselves as well. If our
trading partners can not sell shoes in the United States, many will then not
be able to buy U.S. exports. That would mean more U.S. jobs lost.
Weinraub, Reagan Rejects Shoe Import Curb, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1985, at D5, col. 1; see
Protectionism That Protects Nothing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1985, at A20, col. 2;
Weinraub, Reagan to Push Free Trade in Talk Monday, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1985, at 8,
col. 6; Silk, Protectionist Mood: Mounting Pressure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at DI,
col. 3.
8. Compare Boyd, President Urges U.S. Lawmakers To Block Protectionist 'Stampede,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (President Reagan referred to Congress's
restrictive proposals as "a mindless stampede toward protectionism" and "a one-way
trip to economic distaster [sic]") with Roberts, Curb on Imports of Textiles Gains, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at Al, col. 2 (House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, criticizing
the President's trade policy, accused President Reagan of "being willing to preside
over the de-industrialization of America".
The economic approach of Congress to alleviating trade imbalances is based on
a construction of the concept of reciprocity. Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 4, at 475-76.
That approach poses three threats to the international commercial environment. Id.
at 475. First, reciprocity is bilateral retaliation in which dispute settlement reverts
from multilateral negotiations, such as GAT, to bilateral or unilateral approaches.
Id. at 475-76. Second, reciprocity undermines GATT principles of Most Favored Na-
tion treatment. Id. at 476. Third, reciprocity goes beyond the GATT principle of
national treatment. Id.
This congressional approach contrasts with the approach taken by the executive
branch. E.g., H.R. Doc. No. 100, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H7204-05
(daily ed. Sept. 4, 1985). The International Trade Commission [hereinafter cited as
ITC] recommended to the President import relief for the footwear industry under
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982). 2 INT'L TRADE REP.
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States to function as a member of GATT9 and to maintain a
stable domestic market.' 0
This Note will discuss recent United States import quotas
in light of the United States' obligations under GATT. Be-
cause the United States Constitution and section 301 of the
(BNA) No. 25, at 814 (June 19, 1985). President Reagan "determined that granting
import relief would not be in the national economic interest." H.R. Doc. No. 100,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H7204-05 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1985). Coinci-
dent with President Reagan's decision against imposing shoe import quotas, the ex-
ecutive branch committed its efforts to a "campaign" to enforce United States trade
rights. Farnsworth, Section 301 Is Polished As A U.S. Trade Weapon, N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1985, at DI, col. 1; see 2 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1100 (Sept. 11, 1985);
President's News Conference On Foreign And Domestic Issues, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at
B6, col. 1.
9. Jackson, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Eco-
nomic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1982). Protectionism poses a serious national and
international legal conflict with free and fair trade obligations under GATT. One of
the greatest constraints on the United States management of its international eco-
nomic interests is the interaction of the executive and legislative branches, which
influences United States foreign relations and international trade. Id. at 380.
10. Showing its hostility toward the President's position on trade and the United
States' obligations under GATT, Congress has drafted bills protecting the industries
adversely affected by high levels of imports. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. E4081-82 (daily
ed. Sept. 18, 1985) (statement of Rep. Edgar) (speech supporting H.R. 1562 and
describing the economic woes of garnient factory workers).
Farnsworth, Veto Seen For Curbs On Textiles, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at DI, col.
6. The textile industry in particular has pressured Congress for such legislation.
Textile and apparel workers represent almost Len percent of the United States' man-
ufacturing jobs. Id. Pointing to 200,000 jobs lost and 250 plant closings in the last
four years caused by increasing textile imports, labor and management organizations
lobbied Congress for import restrictions. Id. In a 6-month period, Manchester,
Georgia lost 645 of 1,934 private sector textilejobs due to imports. 131 CONG. REC.
E4156 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Rep. Ray). Representative Ray urged
stipport'of H.R. 1562 to save such domestic jobs. Id.; see, e.g., 131 CONG. REC.
H7606-07 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (statement of Rep. Nichols). "Where can a 50-
year-old black man who has been a loom fixer in a textile mill most of his entire adult
life find a new job?" Id.
GATT provisions have never been formally submitted to Congress for accept-
ance. Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66
MicH. L. REV. 249, 265 (1967). Although recognized by Congress as a cornerstone
of United States trade policy, evidence of congressional ratification of GATT is
equivocal. Id. at 265-69; see also Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 4, at 472 (the United
States still professes a strong commitment to GATT).
Nevertheless, as a former Commerce Department official has observed, retalia-
tion to United States import quotas from areas like the Far East "is going to ... hurt
American industry in places where U.S. competitors want to grow." 2 Irr'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 963 (July 24, 1985); see also Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 4, at
479 (possibility of a trade war in the 1980's).
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Trade Act of 19741 vest the President and Congress with sep-
arate powers,' 2 the United States compliance with interna-
tional agreements like GATT may be insufficient in fulfilling
the United States' obligations. 13 An examination of section
301, GATT, and certain recent protectionist bills, will demon-
strate the need for an improved approach to international
trade imbalances.
Part I of this Note will examine the legal frameworks of
the United States Constitution, GATT, and section 301.14 Part
II will focus on the domestic and international conflicts that
have stemmed from recent protectionist legislation proposed
by Congress. 5 Part III will criticize the conflict between the
President and Congress, the application of section 301, and
the dispute resolution provisions of GATT.'6 Finally, Part IV
will propose improvements for the performance of the United
States under GATT and section 301.17 The Note will conclude
11. Section 301, Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as section 301]. Section 301 provides in part:
(a) Determinations and action by President. If the President determines
that action by the United States is appropriate-
(1) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agree-
ment; or
(2) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or
instrumentality that-
(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies ben-
efits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens
or restricts United States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his
power to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy,
or practice. Action under this section may be taken on a nondiscriminatory
basis or solely against the products or services of the foreign country or
instrumentality involved.
Id.; see infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
The USTR filed three self-initiated section 301 actions: Brazil Informatics, 301-
49, filed Sept. 16, 1985; Japan Tobacco, 301-50, filed Sept. 16, 1985; and Korean
Insurance, 301-51, filed Sept. 16, 1985. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 44, at
1422 (Nov. 6, 1985).
12. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (grant of power to the legislative branch) with U.S.
CONST. art. II (grant of power to the executive branch).
13. See supra note 2; Jackson, supra note 9, at 380.
14. See infra notes 18-82 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 83-134 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
1986] QUOTAS AND GATT
that the United States must improve its trade policy by coordi-
nating its trade actions with section 301 and GATT.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A. The United States Constitution and the Commerce Power
The United States resolves political and legal issues
through the interaction of the legislative and executive
branches.' 8 The United States Constitution empowers Con-
gress to regulate commerce with foreign nations 19 and to ratify
treaties.20 Under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the
President of the United States has the authority to negotiate
international agreements and to carry on international diplo-
macy. 2I The Constitution does not authorize the executive
branch to regulate foreign commerce, 22 yet Congress may au-
thorize the President to negotiate trade agreements and to take
other action affecting the area of foreign commerce. 23 Specifi-
18. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138-81, 194
(1983).
The continual controversy existing between Congress and the executive as
to the extent of each branch's foreign affairs power centers on whether Con-
gress and the president act as constitutional equals in this sphere or whether
the executive initiates foreign policy while the Congress acts merely to im-
plement the president's policy.
Id. at 194.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (foreign commerce power).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (foreign affairs power). Congressional power in
this area is well established. Id.; see also American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v.
United States, 583 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (discussion of congressional foreign trade legislation). In dictum, the court
pointed out the difficulty of determining whether textile trade negotiations constitute
foreign or domestic affairs. 583 F. Supp. at 598.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, supra note 18, at
190-94, 201-11. Executive agreements can be made by the President on his own
authority without congressional approval. Id. at 206; see e.g., Proclamation No.
2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947) (United States participation in GATT).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v.
United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1247 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In authorizing implemen-
tation of international textile trade agreements, Congress statutorily empowered the
President to carry out such agreements. See also United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc.,
526 F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975). "It is nonetheless clear that no undelegated
power to regulate commerce ... inheres in the Presidency." Id. (emphasis in original);
see also Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of
Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1572 (1984) (discussion of
implementing international agreements).
23. Section 101, Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2112 (1982); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The President
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cally, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the Pres-
ident to enforce United States trade agreements. 4 Interaction
between the legislative and executive branches also occurs
through the United States Trade Representative 25 (USTR),
who coordinates the United States' international trade policy.
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negoti-
ates....
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other govern-
mental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provi-
sions of the Constitution.
Id. at 319-20.
Section 101 of the Trade Act of 1974 grants to the President authority to negoti-
ate trade agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982). Section 102 urges the President "to
take all appropriate and feasible steps with his power ... to harmonize, reduce, or
eliminate such barriers to ... international trade." 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1982); see S.
REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 87 (1974) (Congressional bill authorizing the
President to impose import surcharges); see also American Ass'n of Exporters & Im-
porters v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (analyzing congres-
sional authorization to the President to carry out textile agreements by regulation,
the court said that broad delegations in the international field are normal); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (by delegating its commerce powers,
Congress may establish policies and standards and prescribe the rules that imple-
ment those Congressional policies).
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(1) (1982). The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44
Fed. Reg. 69, 273 (1979), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(1) (1982), provides in part
that:
[t]he Trade Representatives shall have primary responsibility .... for devel-
oping, and for coordinating the implementation of, United States interna-
tional trade policy .... The Trade Representative shall serve as the princi-
pal advisor to the President on international trade policy and shall advise
the President on the impact of other policies of the United States Govern-
ment on international trade.
Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (a) provides, in part, that the executive branch will coordinate
tihe'United States' international trade policy with respect to GATT. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2131(a) (1982); see S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1974). The Senate
Committee on Finance, which has responsibility over trade policy and trade agree-
ments, has jurisdiction over the nomination of the USTR. The Senate must consent
to all USTR appointments by the President. The USTR thus serves the two branches
of the United States' Government advising both the President and Congress about
international trade matters. Id. at 105.
Under section 2211, the House Speaker selects a negotiation delegation of five
Congressmen on the recommendation of the Committee on Ways and Means. 19
U.S.C. § 2211 (1982). The President is required to submit annual reports to Con-
gress on trade agreements and on import relief, 19 U.S.C. § 2213(a) (1982), and to
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Conflicts between the legislative and executive branches
of the United States Government often arise when each branch
attempts to resolve the international problem of trade imbal-
ances by opposing means. 26  The power to regulate com-
merce 27 is a jealously guarded congressional power 28 that re-
sults in constant tension between the executive and legislative
branches in the area of foreign commerce. 29 The President's
veto power counterbalances the power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce. 30 Although this balance between the exec-
utive and legislative branches usually results in effective legis-
lation in the area of trade, this separation of powers between
the branches of the federal government has impaired the abil-
ity of the United States to reach an organized and effective
trade policy.31
As a result of this interbranch tension, Congress has fre-
quently overpowered the Administration in trade matters, hin-
dering the implementation of GATT and negotiation under its
terms.3 Responding to special interests in industries dis-
seek information and advice from the private sector with respect to negotiating
objectives before entering a trade agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a) (1982).
26. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89-123
(1972) (discussion of the conflicts created by the separation of powers). Henkin
states that:
[iun the competition for power in foreign affairs, the principal issues have
resulted from Presidential initiatives invoking one or more of his "plenary"
powers, resisted by Congress citing its "plenary" powers; but Presidents
have also accused Congress of "poaching." Sometimes each has claimed
exclusive power, sometimes the power to act as well as the other; occasion-
ally the branches acted differently if not inconsistently and each sought to
prevail.
Id. at 92; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 18, at 136. The
concept of separation of powers is not a technical rule of law but a concept that
recognizes the necessary area of interaction between the branches of the federal gov-
ernment. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 18, at 136.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 342; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra
note 18, at 135-37.
29. Jackson, supra note 9, at 341.
30. Dymock & Vogt, supra note 7, at 499. The Executive veto power functions as
an impediment to Congress in addition to executive proposals to expand trade and
to negotiate trading rules. Id. at 499; see also 2 Irr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at
1104 (Sept. 11, 1985) (executive veto of trade legislation foreseen).
31. Jackson, supra note 9, at 341, 380; see supra note 1 (discussion of differing
executive and legislative approaches to the United States trade imbalance).
32. Jackson, supra note 9, at 341; see, e.g., Brinbaum, Rostenkowski Says Trade Bill
Will Come First, Wall St.J., Sept. 13, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
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tressed by imports, such as domestic textile manufacturers,33
Congress has developed solutions that may benefit those par-
ticular sectors,34 but which may be detrimental to the United
States economy as a whole.35 While protecting a few industries
and distributing the cost of that protection throughout the
economy may seem worthwhile, 36 once protectionist legisla-
tion is in place, even strong policy arguments may fail to pro-
voke Congress to repeal the law if it proves ineffective. This
specialized approach to trade legislation has an international
impact as well. By alleviating the distress of special interests in
an ad hoc fashion, Congress disrupts the overall stability of in-
[President Reagan's] stategy of slowing the push for tougher trade policy
isn't working, and unless he comes up with a plan that brings retribution
against countries who keep out or unfairly drive up the price of U.S. prod-
ucts, he's guaranteed a crippling fight with Congress.
Id. at 3, col. 2.
33. See, e.g., H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed.
March 19, 1985) (a bill to promote economic recovery of United States textile and
apparel industry and workers); see supra note 10 (discussion of textile industry pres-
suring Congress for protectionist legislation).
34. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1580. Special economic sectors in the United
States manipulate the legislative system to obtain certain statutory wordings that will
make the results of their potential cases foreseeable. Id. However, the number of
Congressmen who support free trade may be larger than it seems. Congressmen
may introduce and publicly support protectionist measures to curry favor with con-
stituents. One former United States trade official characterized this as "LydonJohn-
son's iron law of trade: 'Be a free trader, but don't tell a soul because there are no
votes in it.' " CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., TRADE: U.S. POLICY SINCE 1945. 24
(M. Thompson ed. 1984); see Roberts, Congress Trade Revolt: Reagan Lag and Job Cuts,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1985, at Dl, col. 2; 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1345
(Oct. 23, 1985) (United States lawmakers bow to special interest groups lobbying for
import curbs).
35. See infra notes 36-38, 136 and accompanying text.
36. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 1580; Kristof, 'New Wave' View of Protectionism,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at Dl, col. 1. "A country might be willing to accept a
small drop in its standard of living to preserve certain industries that it deems neces-
sary for national security." Kristof, 'New Wave' View of Protectionism, N.Y. Times, Sept.
9, 1985, at DI, col. 1.
37. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1580. Congress established detailed statutory cri-
teria because Congress distrusts executive discretion. See id.; cf 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2252 (1982) (discussed infra at note 86). These formulas may later become inappro-
priate with respect to economic policy or may violate international law. See Jackson,
supra note 22, at 1580. In the Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC)
case, a GATT panel found that a United States law contravened United States inter-
national obligations. Regarding DISC, GATT doc.L/4422 of Nov. 2, 1976, reprinted
in 23d Supp. BISD 98, 99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DISC]; see generally Jackson, The
Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC case in GA TT, 72 AM.J. INT'L L. 747 (1978)
(discussion of DISC).
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terdependent domestic and international markets.38
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Opened for signature in 1947, GATT is the principal in-
ternational multilateral agreement that regulates world
trade.3 9 The agreement symbolizes an economic trend away
from national protectionism and toward international coopera-
tion and interdependence 40 and is intended to apply on both
international and national levels.'" The GATT may be imple-
mented bilaterally, multilaterally, regionally, and institution-
ally by member nations for the expansion of trade. 42 On a na-
tional level, GATT is implemented on both public and private
levels.43 For example, in the United States, the Trade Act of
1974 was drafted to coordinate with the United States GATT
obligations .44
Despite the intended integration of GATT into national
legislation, implementation of GATT in the United States is
impeded by the frictions between the legislative and executive
branches.45 Congress is hostile to GATT because GATT be-
came a legal obligation in the United States without congres-
sional ratification.46 Even if a GATT panel finds that United
38. See Note, Protecting Steel: Time for a New Approach, 96 HARV. L. REV. 866, 885
(1983). Without an industrial policy, the United States government responds to the
current economic pressures in short-sighted fashion. Id. at 885. On Nov. 5, 1985,
Don Bonker, Chairman of the House Democratic Trade Task Force, proposed the
formation of a trade committee to coordinate trade bills. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 45, at 1449 (Nov. 13, 1985). Although the Task Force's proposed trade
committee would attempt to resolve current trade problems by coordinating trade
bills, its ad hoc nature would undermine the coordination it would be designed to
achieve. Id.
39. See GATT', supra note 2; Jackson, supra note 10, at 250.
40. See GATT, supra note 2, preamble; Note, The Law of the GATT: Study & Re-
search, 18J. WORLD TRADE L., 357 (1984). However, the United States does not al-
ways comply with its GATT obligations. See Hudec, GA TT or GABB? The Future Design
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 (1971). The ac-
cumulation of acts of noncompliance has gradually forced GATT to abandon its sys-
tem of detailed rules. This erosion of GATT's integrity may ultimately lead its mem-
bers to abandon GATT in favor of a more permissive international trading scheme.
Id. at 1300.
41. See Note, supra note 40, at 360-65.
42. See id. at 362.
43. See id. at 360-62.
44. See 19 U.S.C. § 2102(3) (1982).
45. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 380.
46. Id. at 347. When trade legislation was before the Senate in 1973, certain
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States law contravenes the United States international legal ob-
ligations under GATT, Congress, acting on a national level,
may choose not to change its law.4 7 Nonetheless, on an inter-
national level, the GATT agreement requires the United States
either to negotiate new trade commitments or to negotiate a
dispute settlement between its member countries.48
According to a Senate committee report on dispute settle-
ment under GATT, GATT provides two types of dispute set-
tlement processes. 49  The report identifies the first of these
processes as settlement by negotiation and agreement. In this
process, the relative economic, political, and military power of
each party would determine the outcome."0 The second of
these processes is settlement by negotiation and agreement,
but with reference to the terms of GATT.51 Some commenta-
events, such as the controversy over the Vietnam conflict and President Nixon's in-
volvement in the burglary of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters,
made Congress reluctant to delegate authority to a President whom Congress did not
trust. Id. at 347. Congress did not enact the Trade Act of 1974 until President Nixon
resigned. Id.; see Jackson, supra note 10, at 268.
47. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 1580; Jackson, supra note 37, at 747.
48. See Note, supra note 40, at 357. However, -[t]here is no single, sharply de-
fined dispute-settlement procedure in GATT." See J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 164.
See also Note, Liberalization of International Trade in the Service Sector. Threshold Problems
and a Proposed Framework under the GATT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 371, 405-08 (1982)
(difficulties in enforcement of GATT procedures give rise to uncertainty).
49. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 13. While GATT does not expressly
provide for two distinct procedures, two can be inferred. Id. at 13.
50. Id.
51. GAIT, supra note 2, art. 22 (Consultation), art. 23 (Nullification or Impair-
ment). Article 22 provides:
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representa-
tions as may be made by any other contracting party with respect to the
operation of customs regulations and formalities, anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duties....
Id. art. 22.
Article 23 in part provides:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as a
result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obliga-
tions under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situations, the contracting party
may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which
it considers to be concerned.
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tors observe that GATT lacks the ability to enforce its terms,
and now provides merely a forum for the airing of disputes, in
which GATT acts more as a basis for mediation and less as a
binding agreement. 2 This viewpoint illustrates a lack of faith
in the ability of GATT to settle disputes.
This lack of faith is justfiable on several grounds.53 First,
article 23, which provides a mechanism for dispute settle-
ment,54 relies on the voting process of GATT.5 5 The GATT's
voting procedure is a one-vote-per-member system that gives
majority power to those developing countries that export in-
tensively to the United States,56 which puts the United States
and other developed countries at a disadvantage. Second, this
dispute procedure encourages lengthy delays. Third, the
outcome of the article 23 process is uncertain because the
phrase "nullification or impairment" is vague and ambiguous,
which allows a country to negotiate a GATT violation with the
country that allegedly violated its GATT obligations.5 8 As arti-
Id. art. 23; see also SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9, 13, 15.
52. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., supra note 34, at 37.
GATT lacks power to enforce its rules because Congress refused to allow
the U.S. government to participate in its proposed administrative bodies,
which consequently never came into being. The 300 member GATT Secre-
tariat, based in Geneva, provides a forum for the airing of disputes among
contracting nations, allowing GATT to perform a mediating role in world
trade.
Id.
53. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the
Context of GATT, 13J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 4-7 (1979).
54. See supra note 51.
55. GATT, supra note 2.
56. Jackson, supra note 53, at 5-7. A majority vote on an article 23 dispute may
in practice necessitate the agreement of the disputants themselves. Id. at 7-8. Other
weaknesses include: 1) a poor complaint process, 2) meager staff resources, 3) poor
fact finding procedures, 4) inadequate review procedures, 5) ambiguous panel find-
ings, and 6) a rigid approach to trade policy. Id. at 7-8; see also SENATE STAFF REPORT,
supra note 7, at 15.
57. Jackson, supra note 53, at 5. The delays may be inordinate. Id. at 5; see also
SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 15. Disputes in GATT may linger for years
without resolution. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 15.
58. GATT, supra note 2, art. 23 (Nullification or Impairment) (see supra note 51);
SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 n.4. Clarifying this ambiguity, the concept
of "prima facie nullification" developed in GATT settlement procedure. The con-
cept applies to cases involving: 1) a breach of legal obligations of GATT, 2) the
enactment of import quotas, or 3) a member nation's subsidization of domestic
goods. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 n.4. Once the complaining nation
shows the prima facie case, the infringing country has the burden of showing that its
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cle 23 is drafted, this dispute procedure provides little more
than an opportunity to negotiate. 59 Another drawback to ef-
fective settlement is that the GATT panel conciliation ap-
proach in article 22 vests too much decision-making power in a
group of panelists,n" who either may be biased in rendering
decisions or may be ill-equipped 6' to interpret vague phrases
in GATT.62
C. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 integrates the rights
and obligations of GATT into United States domestic law.63
Section 301 broadly empowers the President to enforce the
rights of the United States under any trade agreement or to
respond to acts or policies of foreign countries that are con-
trary to any trade agreement or that are otherwise unfair or
restrictive of United States commerce. 64 The President's au-
thority to enforce United States trade rights includes all appro-
actions do not constitute the nullification or impairment prohibited under Article 23.
Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 53, at 6-7. The ambiguities of the nullification or im-
pairment concept burden the decision-making panel with the task of interpreting the
agreement, a task which it may not be competent to perform. Jackson, supra note 53,
at 6. Jackson, supra note 37, at 771.
59. See GATT, supra note 2, art. 23 (Nullification or Impairment) (a contracting
party may make a written proposal to another contracting party in respect to a possi-
ble GATT violation); see supra note 51.
60. Jackson, supra note 53, at 6. In representing his country a GATT panelist
may be biased by his nation's trade objectives and policies. Id. at 6.
61. Jackson, supra note 53, at 7. Due to lack of expertise, panels may be unable
to make the necessary legal and equitable applications of the vague Article 23, and
the panels may make political recommendations beyond the authority granted under
the article. Id. at 7. But seeJackson, supra note 37, at 764. "Over the course of GATT
history, there have been a large number of Panel reports on article [23] complaints"
and there have been a number of instances of fine legal and jurisprudential reason-
ing. Id. at 764.
62. 2 Irr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 959 (July 24, 1985). Despite these
faults, the GATT dispute mechanism is still a viable settlement procedure for the
United States. For example, the GATT Council established a dispute panel to in-
quire into Japanese quota restrictions on shoe imports in response to a complaint
filed by the United States. Id. at 959. But cf 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 42, at
1326 (Oct. 23, 1985). Retaliating for a United States complaint about European Eco-
nomic Community wheat imports, European Community lodged a complaint in
GATT against United States subsidy programs. Id. at 1326.
63. Section 301,supra note 11, 19 U.S.C. § 2411;Jackson, supra note 10, at 261.
The rights and obligations of GATT are implemented through national legislation of
the member country. Jackson, supra note 10, at 261.
64. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
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priate and feasible actions within his power.65 Section 301
functions as a discretionary tool for implementing trade policy
with respect to unfair trade practices of foreign governments.66
This section authorizes the President to act on his own with a
minimum of procedural requirements. In addition, under
section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974, any interested private
citizen may petition the USTR, requesting Presidential action
under section 301.68 Under this provision, the USTR may in
his discretion determine to initiate an investigation.69
Although within the power authorized by Congress,70 the
President's discretionary power under the Trade Act of 1974 is
circumscribed. 7' Congress is unlikely to give any new author-
65. Id.
66. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) provides that:
[i]f the President decides to take action under this section and no petition
requesting action on the matter involved has been filed under section 2412
of this title, the President shall publish notice of his determination, includ-
ing the reasons for the determination in the Federal Register. Unless he
determines that expeditious action is required, the President shall provide
an opportunity for the presentation of views concerning the taking of such
action.
Id.
67. Id.; Archibald, supra note 6, at 4; see Dymock & Vogt, supra note 7, at 508-09.
68. Section 302, Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982). Section 302 pro-
vides as follows:
(a) Any interested person may file a petition with the [USTRI ... requesting
the President to take action under section 2411 of this title and setting forth
the allegations in support of the request. The Trade Representative shall
review the allegations in the petition and, not later than 45 days after the
date on which he received the petition, shall determine whether to initiate
an investigation.
(b)(l) If the Trade Representative determines not to initiate an investiga-
tion with respect to a petition, he shall inform the petitioner of his reasons
therefor and shall publish notice of the determination, together with a sum-
mary of such reasons, in the Federal Register.
(2) If the Trade Representative determines to initiate an investigation with
respect to a petition, he shall initiate an investigation regarding the issues
raised. The Trade Representative shall publish the text of the petition in
the Federal Register and shall, as soon as possible, provide opportunity for
the presentation of views concerning the issues, including a public hearing
Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (1982); S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 185. While drafting the Trade Act of 1974, increasing ill will between Congress
and the President prompted Congress to design measures that circumscribe adminis-
trative discretion. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 185.
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ity to the Administration in this area. 2 Actions taken pursuant
to section 301 are limited in number because of the adminis-
trative cost and length involved. 7 1 Since July 1976, only fifty-
one section 301 complaints have been filed, 4 and only three
cases have been initiated in 1986 by the USTR in fulfillment of
President Reagan's proposal to enforce trade sanctions."
As a complement to section 301, section 302 can be used
as a private channel for complaints in respect to international
trade, 76 thereby enabling a private citizen to participate di-
rectly in the resolution of the trade problem. 7 This kind of
private enforcement demonstrates the availability of section
301 as a mechanism for dispute resolution.78 As a practical
matter, the citizen who files a section 301 petition is urged to
solicit advice from the USTR. 79 Not only may private parties
file section 301 claims, but they may participate in the ensuing
investigation as well.80 The USTR publishes a notice in the
Federal Register requesting public comment or a public hear-
72. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1227 (Oct. 2, 1985). Some mem-
bers of Congress have suggested that more authority under section 301 be advanced
to the USTR. Id. at 1227.
73. See 2 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1100 (Sept. 11, 1985). The wide
ranging authority of the President to react against unfair trade practices of other
countries does not make section 301 an instant cure for United States trade
problems. One source estimated that the recently initiated section 301 actions, see
supra note 1, will take at least one year to resolve. Id. at 1100.
74. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 44, 1414-22 (Nov. 6, 1985) (reprinting a
current table of section 301 cases from the USTR office).
75. See supra notes 1, 74.
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982); see Archibald, supra note 6, at 4; Dymock & Vogt,
supra note 7, at 509.
77. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 21. In comparison to the political
organization of less democratic states, the political structure of the United States per-
mits the participation of interested private citizens in the enforcement of domestic
trade rights such as those provided in the Trade Act of 1974. Unfortunately, the
right of a private citizen to influence trade negotiations renders the United States
Government less flexible in trade negotiations when negotiating trade policy with
foreign governments. Id.
78. Id.
79. Archibald, supra note 6, at 5. Such consultations save time and effort by
coordinating United States trade policies with the narrow objectives of the private
citizen complainant. Id. at 5.
80. See Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301, 306, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411, 2416 (1982). Sec-
tion 306 provides in part that "[tihe Trade Representative shall . . . keep the peti-
tioner regularly informed of all determinations and developments regarding his case
under this section, including the reasons for any undue delays .. " Id.; see Proce-
dures for Complaints Filed Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006 (1982); Archibald, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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ing on the issues raised by the petition.8 ' This procedure set-
tles trade disputes by reference to pre-existing GATT obliga-
tions.S2
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL IMPORT
QUOTAS AND THE GATT
A. The Domestic Conflict
During the fall of 1985, Congress proposed more than
300 protectionist bills in response to distress in United States
industries harmed by imports.8 3 While Congress focused on
protectionism, the President and the USTR proposed stricter
enforcement of section 301, asking Congress to grant the exec-
utive branch more power to act in defense of free trade.8 4 The
recent surge of protectionist bills reflects Congress's reasser-
tion of its right to regulate foreign commerce under article I,
section 8 of the United States Constitution 5 and its rejection
of its former authorization of power to the President, embod-
ied in section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.86 This domestic
81. Trade Act of 1974, § 302, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982), which in part provides
that "the Trade Representative shall publish the text of the petition in the Federal
Register and shall, as soon as possible, provide opportunity for the presentation of
views concerning the issues, including a public hearing .. " Id.
82. See 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982);Jackson, supra note 22, at 1571. Section 301, in
providing specified rules, insures conformity with the private citizen's expectations of
GATT as an international body. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1571.
83. H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed. March
19, 1985); see supra notes 1, 10 and accompanying text.
84. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1183-84 (Sept. 25, 1985) (Congress
reacted to Reagan's section 301 policy initiative as a good signal to trading partners
but too late to stop Congress from proposing a trade quota bill). See supra notes 1,
18-28, and accompanying text.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
86. Pursuant to its authority under 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) and (d), the ITC issued
a report to the President on its recommendations. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b), (d)
(1982); supra note 8. The ITC determination and report to the President recom-
mended that the executive impose a 5 year quota on shoe imports. Supra note 8.
President Reagan was within his authority granted by Congress to withhold quota
reliefs by rejecting the ITC recommendation, provided that the recommended shoe
import relief was not in the United States' economic interest. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(l)(A) (1982). In determining whether to provide relief, the President has a
range of factors that he may consider if they are relevant. Id. Some of these are:
1) probable effectiveness of import relief, 2) effect of import relief on consumers,
3) effect of import relief on United States international obligations, 4) United States
international liability respecting compensation as a result of the import relief, and
5) economic and social costs were import relief provided or not. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)
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conflict between the legislative and executive branches, cre-
ated by the United States constitutional and statutory system,
constrains the development of an effective international trade
policy.8 7 By retreating to protectionism and reasserting its
constitutional powers in commerce matters, Congress not only
threatened the disruption of domestic and international mar-
kets but also the breach of international obligations agreed to
in GATT.8 8
In December 1985, the President vetoed a major piece of
proposed protectionist legislation.89 By exercising his veto,
the President thwarted passage of the bill, thereby preserving
not only United States international trade obligations, but also
the foreign affairs power of the executive branch.90 Moreover,
the President maximized the life of the bill as long as possible
to ease the protectionist pressures in Congress and to cause
concern among United States trading partners. 9 t In this way,
the President incorporated the views of Congress into his ac-
tions to reduce the possibility of a legislative veto.9 2 Although
the President may have reduced interbranch tension by incor-
porating Congress's opinion regarding trade legislation into
his international policy, this type of political maneuvering
blurs the separation of powers.9" As a result, the executive
branch may take a less desirable position in trade negotiations
(1982). Although the President's rejection of the recommendation was within his
authorized discretionary power, Congress supported the ITC findings, 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 973 (July 31, 1985), and sought to enact them. See supra note
1, 8 and accompanying text.
87. Jackson, supra note 9, at 341.
88. See supra notes 5, 7.
89. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 1, 1986) (President Reagan ve-
toes the trade bill); see supra note 1 (discussing veto of H.R. 1562).
90. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 1, 1985). By preventing the bill's
passage, President Reagan avoided goading United States trading partners into filing
compensation claims and taking extensive retaliatory actions against the United
States. Id. at 6; see also supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
91. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48 at 1518 (Dec. 4, 1985); 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1234-35 (Oct. 2, 1985). Three hundred protectionist bills
certainly sent a strong signal to exporter nations with closed markets. 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1234-35 (Oct. 2, 1985). One narrow political objective for
drafting such a volume of restrictive trade legislation may have been simply to make
the United States public aware of the trade deficit. Id.
92. See Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Jackson, supra note 9, at
348.
93. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 381.
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in order to gain congressional approval.94
During the fall of 1985, as Congress was debating the bill
he later vetoed, the President took a firm position by propos-
ing to resolve the trade imbalance through enforcement of sec-
tion 301."5 Under this proposal, the USTR was to open certain
export markets to resolve the trade imbalance, 96 thereby pro-
viding for the enforcement of United States rights and obliga-
tions under trade agreements in response to certain foreign
trade practices.9 7 According to the President, use of these
trade sanctions would help United States exporters98 and en-
able the United States to realize the joint economic objective
of the Trade Act of 1974 and GATT to expand trade and to
improve international trading rules.99 However, the use of
section 301 does not alleviate distress in United States markets
affected by high amounts of imports, °'0 and therefore does not
94. See id. The executive may oversell negotiations with other trading partners
to gain congressional approval. Id.
95. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
96. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1100 (Sept. 11, 1985). Opening
overseas markets is the primary objective of proposing the initiation of a section 301
trade action. See id. at 1100. The USTR targeted the European Community, Japan,
South Korea, and Brazil as closed markets. Id. A closed market is an economy that is
not engaging in international trade. See D. SALVATORE, supra note 4, at 420.
97. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1982). Section 301(a)(1), providing for the en-
forcement of United States trade rights, requires the enforcement of "the rights of
the United States under any trade agreement." Id.
98. See Farnsworth, Section 301 Is Polished As U.S. Trade Weapon, N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1985, at D13, col. 1 (an action taken under section 301 is directed towards for-
eign, not domestic, markets).
99. See Dymock & Vogt, supra note 7, at 499. In 1981, the USTR stated that the
United States trade policy is "aimed at the achievement of open trade and the reduc-
tion of trade distortions .. " Id. at 499. Stating a free trade objective, GATT pro-
vides:
that [the contracting parties'] relation in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the
world and expanding the production and exchange of goods....
GATT, supra note 2, preamble; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a) (1982) (on bringing ex-
isting trade agreements into conformity with principles promoting an open, nondis-
criminatory, and fair international economy).
100. Cf Trade Act of 1974, § 301(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (1982). Section
301(b)(2) provides that the President may "impose duties or other import restric-
tions on the products of, and fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign
country or instrumentality for such time as he determines appropriate." Id.; see also
Farnsworth, Section 301 Is PolishedAs U.S. Trade Weapon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1985, at
D13, col. 1. Curbing foreign protectionism under section 301 helps employees of
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lessen the pressures in Congress for import quotas.
B. The International Conflict
The conflict between the executive and legislative ap-
proaches to the United States trade imbalance has several in-
ternational effects. First, congressional import quotas inter-
fere with new trade agreements negotiated under GATT, and
by doing so impair efforts to improve GATT's dispute settle-
ment procedures.' 0 ' Second, Congress's unilateral approach
reduces the United States' effectiveness as a member of
GATT. 0 2 Third, this interbranch conflict highlights that the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides
for the constitutional preemption of international agreements
such as GATT.'1 3 Finally, Congress's unilateral approach dis-
torts both the current GATT dispute settlement process and
international economic relations. 10 4
As Congress has solidified its position on unilateral trade
action, legislative distrust in the effectiveness of GATT leaves
Congress wary of multilateral negotiations. 0 5 However, pro-
tectionist legislation interferes with the free trade goals of
GATT. Attempts by Congress to enact protectionist legisla-
tion have directly conflicted with efforts by the USTR to seek a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT. 10 6
This conflict has intensified as Congress has sought to restrict
a greater percentage of imports from developing countries
than those from industrial nations. 10 7 Because GATT was
United States export industries and not those hurt by imports such as United States
shoe manufacturers. Farnsworth, Section 301 Is Polished As U.S. Trade Weapon, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1985, at D13, col. 1.
101. See infra note 105-11 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
105. See J. JACKsON, supra note 2, at 163-81; see Note, supra note 48, at 405-06.
106. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 958 (July 24, 1985). To the interna-
tional trading community, the United States trade policy seemed confused. Id.
While the USTR sought to open GATT negotiations, Congress sought to impose
protectionist measures on the prospective negotiating partners. Id.; see also H.R.
1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed. March 19, 1985) (a bill
to impose import quotas).
107. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 918 (July 17, 1985). Congress
targeted the proposed quotas toward countries whose exports exceeded their im-
ports. Id. Countries that are relatively less developed than the United States such as
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comprised of a majority of developing countries, 08 and re-
quired a majority vote to convene the Special Session sought
by the United States, 09 the highly visible protectionist actions
by Congress may jeopardize the role of the United States in
improving GATT decision-making procedures. 10 The public-
ity that has attended the trade policy dispute within the United
States Government may damage the USTR's ability to negoti-
ate within the GATT framework.'
The import quotas recently proposed by Congress typify
the kind of unilateral trade restrictions that are prohibited by
the multilateral GATT agreement."i 2 Such unilateral actions
have offended United States trading partners and deterred
them from participating in trade negotiations.' 1 3 For example,
when Congress threatened to enact textile import quota legis-
lation in the fall of 1985, South Korea threatened to withdraw
support from any United States multilateral trade negotia-
tions. 1 4 The contradictory approaches taken by the President
and Congress also may have reduced trust in the United States
as a negotiating partner.' By legislating import quotas and
Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea fell into this category. Id. However, Japan did not
fall into this category. Id.
108. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
109. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 948 (July 24, 1985). In July of
1985, the United States called for a Special Session of GATT's 90 members in order
to convene a meeting of senior GATT officials. Id. To convene the Special Session,
the assent of 46 contracting parties was required. Id.
110. Trade Act of 1974, § 121(a)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(1) (1985) sets forth
the United States role in GATT. The Trade Act provides that the President shall
revise the decision-making procedures in GATT to reflect a balance of economic in-
terests between trading nations. Id. This role is compromised by Congress' protec-
tionist stance. Because the voting majority of GATT is composed of developing
countries, whose exports to the United States compete with United States products,
Congress' protectionist legislation has jeopardized the fulfillment of the Trade Act of
1974's objective to bring the terms of GAIT into conformity with principles of free
and fair trade. See Jackson, supra note 53, at 2.
111. SeeJackson, supra note 9, at 381. In theory, member nations of GATT may
monitor the acts of the United States President and Congress. By raising their con-
cerns in an appropriate manner and at an appropriate time, member nations may
influence the interbranch process to maximize the advancement of their interests. Id.
at 381.
112. See supra note 5; see also GATT, supra note 2, art. 11 (General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions).
113. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 973-74 (July 31, 1985).
114. Id. at 973.
115. Dymock & Vogt, supra note 7, at 499.
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ignoring the dispute settlement procedure under GATT,
t
"
6
Congress materially changed the United States negotiating po-
sition to one that takes advantage of the United States' bar-
gaining power." t
7
The tension between the legislative and executive
branches highlights that under the United States' implementa-
tion of a hierarchy of norms" t 8 the United States Constitution
preempts international agreements such as GATT."'9 The hi-
erarchy of norms doctrine determines which among contradic-
tory legal doctrines will control. 120  In the United States, the
supremacy clause elevates the powers of the United States
Constitution over the rights and duties of GATT as an interna-
tional agreement. 12  The commerce powers granted to Con-
gress under article II of the Constitution impede the ability of
GATT to promote free trade between trading partners.
22
While the hierarchy of norms doctrine permits the Constitu-
116. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1571; see supra note 49 and accompanying text;
Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1651. Protectionist bills that are oriented toward a
particular section of the economy not only disturb economic markets but also erode
the effectiveness of GATT. Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1651; see Hudec, supra note
40, at 1300.
117. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1571; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
118. Jackson, supra note 9, at 268-69. The hierarchy of norms doctrine deter-
mines which law will prevail among contradictory legal documents. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The supremacy clause of article VI indicates that the
United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &
J. YOUNG, supra note 18, at 6, 18-20. Thus, under the hierarchy of norms doctrine,
when a conflict arises between the United States Constitution and an international
agreement such as GAT', the supremacy clause requires that the United States Con-
stitution prevail. Jackson, supra note 9, at 269.
120. See supra note 118.
121. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 610-11 (3d ed.
1979). Constitutional limitations determine the validity of international negotiations.
Id.; see also California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974) (the area of
foreign relations may be subject to less constitutional restraint than domestic affairs);
Jackson, supra note 9, at 380, 388. Although the President has the power to negotiate
for the United States, Congress retains the power to ratify. Jackson, supra note 9, at
388. Coordinating the two processes involves balancing the distribution of these
powers, but this process takes time and effort. Id. Meanwhile, the free trade objec-
tives of GATT remain difficult negotiating objectives for the United States to obtain.
Id. The United States can be bound by an international obligation under interna-
tional law, yet may not comply with that obligation in its domestic law. Id. at 359.
See, e.g., DISC, supra note 37. An international agreement like GATT does not dis-
pose of constitutional power; instead the United States retains the power to violate its
treaty obligations. L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 151; see supra notes 118-19 and ac-
companying text.
122. Jackson, supra note 9, at 380, 388.
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tion to be the supreme law of the land, this doctrine in effect
encourages a breach of international legal obligations. 23
Congress' unilateral approach distorts both the current
GATT dispute settlement process and international relations.
Lacking faith in the effectiveness of GATT dispute settlement
process, 124 Congress did not attempt to resolve the United
States trade imbalance under the dispute procedures of articles
22-23.125 Although Congress could have resolved the trade
dispute through section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,126 Con-
gress sought to handle the international trade problem unilat-
erally, without the participation of the executive branch. 2 7
Trade actions of this type, outside the framework of GATT,
may lead to sectional rather than international treatment of an
international problem. 28 Narrow, sectional protectionism ex-
emplifies the congressional view that the overall rights and ob-
ligations of the international economy are not balanced.' 29
The United States is caught between the contradictory
goals of implementing GATT in United States law and at-
tempting to legislate restrictive trade quotas. 30  While the
United States complies with GATT in permitting maximum
123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. See SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 14-15. Because the United States
has a weaker bargaining position than developed countries on one-vote-per-member
basis, Congress views the dispute settlement process as biased and unfair. Id. at 15.
See generally Jackson, supra note 37, at 754 (GATT uses majority voting).
125. See supra note 1 (instead Congress ignored GATT procedures and drafted
its own trade legislation).
126. See supra note 11, 63-82 and accompanying text.
127. See Roberts, Congress Chiefs Warn of Action To Curb Trade, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1985, at Al, col. 5. In a bipartisan effort, Congress adopted protectionist trade bills,
ignoring President Reagan's section 301 proposal, and defying his threat to veto the
bills. Id.
128. Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 4, at 476. If permitted to proliferate, sectoral
unilateral acts would lead to the disintegration of GATT and other multilateral at-
tempts to coordinate international trade, thereby leading to a war of all against all.
Id.
129. Id. at 473. This viewpoint accounts for the broad based political appeal of
protectionism as a solution for Congress in redressing the trade imbalance. Id. at
473.
130. Compare GATT, supra note 2, preamble with H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed. March 19, 1985). For example, although the
preamble of GATT provides for "expanding the production and exchange of
goods," GATT, supra note 2, preamble, H.R. 1562 sought to increase textile import
quotas by 5 percent annually. H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
H1275 (daily ed. March 19, 1985); see also supra note 1 (discussion of H.R. 1562).
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imports,' 3 1 it also violates GATT by shielding certain parts of
its domestic economy, thereby failing to comply with GAIT. 3 2
Protecting domestic labor by imposing trade restrictions like
import quotas impairs the international economy.13 3 With the
executive branch attempting to comply with GATT while the
legislative branch attempts to violate that agreement, imple-
mentation of GATT in the United States may itself be a barrier
to trade.13 4
III. CRITICISMS
Although both branches seek to improve the United States
economy, the tensions between the President and Congress
are unnecessarily antagonistic. 13 Protectionist reactions by
Congress provide economic aid to particular sectors at the risk
of disrupting the international trading system and compromis-
ing United States legal obligations under GATT. 36 Congress'
threatened override of the President's veto forces the Presi-
dent to oversell trade negotiations with other partners to gain
congressional approval at the expense of a greater degree of
free trade. 7 The Administration's proposal to impose section
301 trade sanctions attempts to improve international trade for
the United States in a manner consistent with GATT, but does
little to alleviate protectionist pressures in Congress. 3 8 How-
ever, the President remains constrained by the limited con-
gressional authorization of power, a constraint which seems
131. GATT, supra note 2, art. 13 (Nondiscriminatory Administration of Quanti-
tative Restrictions).
132. See H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed.
March 19, 1985); H.R. 1973, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1901 (daily ed.
April 3, 1985);Jackson, supra note 22, at 1574-75. In addition to its substantive trade
policies, the United States attempts: 1) to maximize the opportunity to receive all
relevant facts, 2) to prevent corruption, 3) to enhance the opportunity to be heard,
4) to base dispute settlement on fairness and not power, 5) to be efficient, and 6) to
govern with consistency and stability. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1574-75.
133. See D. SALVATORE, supra note 4, at 208, 213.
134. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1570.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 5, 34-38 and accompanying text. Although it appeases con-
gressional constituencies, protectionism only treats a mere symptom, rather than a
cause, of the decline in United States competitiveness. The focus of protectionism is
on the high level of imports, a result of an overvalued dollar. Dymock & Vogt, supra
note 7, at 498.
137. See supra note 1 (discussion of congressional override).
138. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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likely to remain unchanged.' 39  Furthermore, section 301 may
be targeted toward sectors that are too specific for significant
improvement of the United States' trading position. 40 While
section 301 benefits bilateral resolutions,' 4 ' section 301 com-
plaints, initiated by the USTR in attacking those unfair trade
practices not found to be illegal under GATT,'42 may circum-
vent the GATT multilateral agreement. 4 3 Complaints initi-
ated by private citizens may harass foreign trading partners
when the private sector manipulates section 301 to ensure its
domestic interests. 144
Many commentators criticize the effectiveness of GATT
for its inability to resolve trade disputes. "45 Noncompliance
with rules that are out of date, unfair or vague makes GATT
unattractive as a means of dispute settlement.' 46 Others have
argued that GATT is adequate to resolve disputes. 14 7 For ex-
ample, a proposed new round of multilateral trade negotia-
139. See supra notes 22-26, 31, 84 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 41, at 1289 (Oct. 16, 1985). For
example, the three section 301 actions, begun in the fall of 1985, were directed
against Korean, Japanese, and Brazilian markets, only a small part of the export mar-
ket of the United States. Id.
141. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1329 (Oct. 23, 1985). The USTR
found section 301 an appropriate tool for bilateral resolution and a complement to
GATT procedure for the European Community wheat export case. Id. at 1329.
142. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 44, 1390 (Nov. 6, 1985). Section 301 com-
plaints of unfair trade practices may not be illegal trade practices under GATT. Id. at
1390.
143. Archibald, supra note 6, at 8. The section 301 process is not bound by
international agreements such as GAT, so the President can retaliate with or with-
out international authority. Id.
144. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1579. Similar abuse occurred when the domestic
television industry manipulated section 301 to harass the foreign television industry.
Id.
145. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1651. "Nations use the GATT only
to claim their 'rights', never to fulfill their obligations." Id.
146. Jackson, supra note 53, at 1-2. Noncompliance results from a lack of an
adequate system: 1) to revise and amend GAT, and 2) to apply GATT rules and
resolve disputes. Id.; see 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1025-26 (Aug. 14,
1985). On Aug. 13, 1985, USTR Yeutter said that GATT trade rules have fallen into
disuse or abuse. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1025-26 (Aug. 14, 1985).
Protectionism in the United States will increase if GATT becomes ineffective and
irrelevant to the current international economy. Id. at 1026; see also SENATE STAFF
REPORT, supra note 7, at 5, 16 (noncompliance with GATT obligations may become
informally "legalized").
147. See 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 101 (Jan. 15, 1986). An ITC report
found that the existing settlement mechanisms under GATT are usually adequate.
Id.
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tions would complement the dispute settlement mechanism,148
and would offer an opportunity both to improve international
trading rules and to restore Congress' faith in GATT. 14 9
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The international trading system should not be threatened
by import quotas from Congress. Congress should abandon
its protectionist stance and develop, with the President and the
USTR, a policy that is consistent with section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974. This trade policy should minimize sectional, pro-
tectionist measures and focus on improving the United States'
short and long-term economic gain.
The office of the USTR could act as the bridge between
Congress and the President in forming this policy. Accord-
ingly, the USTR should make more section 301 complaints in
order to achieve short-term bilateral resolutions of the trade
imbalance. The United States could improve the long-term
prospects for its trade imbalance by using section 301 to en-
courage its trading partners to negotiate new trade agree-
ments. By threatening to file a section 301 complaint and to
engage a trading partner in protracted litigation, the United
States could provide an incentive to resolve trade disputes
through negotiation.' 50 To facilitate productive negotiations,
the USTR should be free from interfering congressional dele-
gations. 5 ' Also, Congress should allow the President more
148. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1224 (Oct. 2, 1985). During the fall
of 1985, an agenda for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations was formulated
by the USTR. Id. at 1224. Setting a precedent in GATT, the United States called for
an extraordinary session of member states. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 36, at
1106 (Sept. 11, 1985). A majority of GATT members agreed to the session and be-
gan formulating an agenda. Id. at 1106.
149. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 1579 (Dec. 18, 1985). The proposed
GAT negotiations may be GATT's last chance to improve its credibility with the
United States Congress. Id. at 1579. If these negotiations fail, GATT may be further
undercut by more protectionist legislation from the United States. Id. Recognizing
the need to reform GATT enforcement rules, Congress urged negotiators to begin a
new round of trade negotiations to discuss reform. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.
44, at 1390 (Nov. 6, 1985). However, interbranch conflict impairs initiation of new
trade negotiations. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 49, at 1555 (Dec. 11, 1985). For
example, Senator Baucus threatened that if President Reagan vetoed the import
quota bill, Congress would not support GATT multilateral trade negotiations pend-
ing in 1986. Id.
150. See Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 4, at 471.
151. 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (1982); see supra note 23.
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negotiating authority in the area of foreign commerce. Finally,
Congress should reduce its hostility towards GATT, and con-
gressional acts should conform with GATT.152 If such a policy
is formulated and implemented, the United States could func-
tion better as a trading partner, as a member of GATF, and as
a participant in the international economy.
CONCLUSION
The United States must develop a coordinated approach
in resolving United States trade imbalances. If the percentage
of United States imports or exports should be reduced or in-
creased, respectively, the United States has both international
and national obligations to effectuate such economic goals
through the existing legal frameworks of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974. If these legal structures are inadequate, the United
States has the responsibility to negotiate improvements
through multilateral agreements. Protectionist legislation is
not only a policy of dubious economic benefit, 5 3 but it is also
contrary to the international trade policy that the United States
has ratified in both international and national law.
John . Reinke
152. J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 163-81; see Note, supra note 48, at 405.
153. Compare Kristof, 'New Wave' View of Protectionism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985,
at DI, col. 1, with Passel, Protectionism just Won't Work, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1985, at
A30, col. 1. See also 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1243 (Oct. 2, 1985).
Although both the Congressional and the Presidential approaches target the import
and export markets, respectively, each approach makes the world trading system a
scapegoat for certain lagging sectors of the United States. Id. Just as imports and
exports influence the domestic economy, so also may fiscal and monetary policy in-
fluence the economy. The world growth rate has declined over 1.5 percent over the
past decade, thereby exacerbating the overvaluation of the United States dollar and
the growth of the United States deficit. Id. See generally 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 45, at 1450 (Nov. 13, 1985); 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1405 (Nov. 6,
1985).
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